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Employee Shares Option Scheme (ESOS) is theorised as a solution to bridge the interest of 
managers with owners of the firms particularly in setting where ownership is widely held. 
Modern corporations in developing countries are characterised by controlling shareholders 
who are also actively involved in the management of firms.  The resultant conflict of interests 
between the majority and the minority shareholders questions the suitability of ESOS in 
aligning their interests towards the firm’s common goal.  Findings from the study suggest that 
the usual determinants of ESOS adoption in the West do not hold in the environment of high 
ownership concentration.  The post-adoption performance has not improved and there is no 
significant difference between the adopting and the non-adopting firms after controlling for 
size and industry.  Nonetheless, there is evidence of better performance for adopting firms in 
terms of profitability albeit very weak in magnitude.
Keywords: Employee Shares Option Scheme (ESOS), Interest Alignment, Agency Problems, 
Post-Adoption Performance.
Introduction
The introduction of a modern corporation 
has marked a new era in managing business. 
Owners no longer manage the business 
themselves, instead hiring professional 
managers to do so on their behalf.  Whilst 
the philosophy helps to overcome the lack 
of competency to manage firms, it has at 
the same time brought with it a new set of 
problems (agency problems).
Agency problems arise when one party 
(managers) has more knowledge than the 
others and whose behaviour cannot be 
directly observed or monitored at all times. 
As Jensen & Meckling (1976) point out, 
professional managers have the incentives 
to take on decisions that may not be in the 
best interest of the owners but may well be 
maximizing the utility of the decision-makers 
(managers). One of the ways to converge the 
managers’ interest with that of the owners 
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Scheme (ESOS).  Since the value of ESOS 
is a function of the prevailing firm’s share 
price, managers have incentives to take on 
positive net present value projects, minimise 
shirking behaviours and start aligning their 
interest with the owners’  to maximise the 
firm’s value. By making managers part of the 
owners, they will ensure that the objective of 
the firm is met.
Although ESOS is fast gaining popularity 
as the converging tool, the appropriate use 
of ESOS has been questioned. In Malaysia, 
prior to 9th February 2004, ESOS was 
governed under Schedule 1 of the Securities 
Commission Act 1993 (SCA) through 
Guidance Notes 8B and 9A. The process starts 
with an application by the firm’s through 
its Board of Directors after being endorsed 
by the firm shareholders. ESOS are then 
granted to intended recipients upon approval 
from the Securities Commission (SC) with 
the amount to each recipient usually vetted 
by the firm’s remuneration committee. After 
this period, ESOS is solely governed by the 
firm’s ESOS Guidelines or Charter. In an 
environment where the firm’s ownership is 
dispersed, the use of ESOS is logical as it is 
expected to bring together the interests of the 
owners and the managers.  However, firms 
with high ownership concentration where 
agency problem exists between the majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders, 
the use of ESOS would only exacerbate the 
situation.  In emerging markets the occurrence 
of controlling shareholders or their family 
members managing the firm is also quite 
widespread. As such, the adoption of ESOS 
would not align the interest but could be used 
as a tool to expropriate wealth instead.  With 
this conjecture as a background, this study 
is set to find evidence to see if the above 
proposition is substantiated.
Findings from the study suggest that the 
usual determinants of ESOS adoption in the 
West do not hold in the environment of high 
ownership concentration.  The post-adoption 
performance has not improved and there is no 
significant difference between the adopting 
and the non-adopting firms after controlling 
for size and industry.  Nonetheless, there is 
evidence of better performance for adopting 
firms in terms of profitability albeit very 
weak in magnitude.
The immediate section reviews all the 
relevant literature before a research 
methodology is proposed next to capture 
the intended effect.  This is followed by the 
findings and a discussion of the study before 
a conclusion is offered.
Literature Review
Conceptually, there are two (2) types of 
agency problem faced by firms around the 
world. The first type of agency problem is 
between the principals and the agents and is 
known as type I problem.  This type of agency 
problem is more prevalent in countries where 
ownership is rather dispersed.  In contrast, 
type II agency problem exists between the 
majority and the minority shareholders, 
where there is high ownership concentration 
among firms.  While the former condition 
(dispersed ownership) is common among 
the developed countries the latter type of 
problem is unique to the emerging markets or 
developing countries (Claessens, Djankov, & 
Lang, 2000; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Khatri, 
Leruth, & Piesse, 2002; Mitton, 2002).
 
Theoretically ESOS should serve as an 
interest alignment tool to converge the 
managers’ interest in line with the owners’, 
particularly for type I agency problem.  For 
a country like Malaysia whose ownership 
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(Capulong, Edwards, Webb, & Zhuang, 
2000), the use of ESOS or ESOP is highly 
questionable.  High ownership concentration 
induces type II not type I agency problem. 
Hence, the use of ESOS or ESOP is not 
likely to solve the misalignment problem. 
Giving ESOS or ESOP to controlling 
shareholders who are typically involved in 
the running of the business will not help to 
solve the convergence of interest as there is 
no asymmetric information problem except 
between the controlling (majority) and the 
minority shareholders.  The act of adopting 
ESOS or ESOP could very well signal that 
wealth expropriation is taking place.
Evidence from the developed countries lends 
some support to ESOS being the alignment 
tool, albeit weakly.  Yermack (1995) provides 
a comprehensive study on the determinants 
of ESOP (Employees Share Option Plan) 
for American firms based on the agency and 
financial contracting theory and finds only 
weak supports for the relationship between 
agency cost reductions and ESOP. Matsunaga 
(1995), also an American-based study on the 
effectiveness of ESOS to curb agency cost, 
on the other hand, reports that the lower the 
value of reported income relative to a target 
level, the greater the value of ESOP per 
employee issued. This shows that firms do 
value ESOS / ESOP as an interest alignment 
catalyst to achieve their financial goals.  In 
contrast, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that 
institutional investors do not favour ESOS 
adoption as revealed by a negative relation 
between institutional-investor concentrations 
to the level of executive compensation 
especially share option grants.
Evidence from the emerging market as 
depicted by Ding and Sun (2001) study 
indicates that in Singapore the value of 
ESOP is positively associated with the 
firms’ growth opportunities but negatively 
related to debt servicing capacity. While 
high-growth opportunity firms need to 
retain the key employees in the company, 
this is an offset by the probability of 
violating debt covenants that could bring 
negative consequences.  Since ESOS / ESOP 
literature from  emerging markets is sparse, 
its effectiveness has not been thoroughly 
evaluated.
The Malaysian corporate sector is 
characterized by an insider system of 
corporate governance where in certain 
firms, high levels ownership concentration, 
cross holdings and significant participation 
of owners in management are apparent 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; 
Lemmons & Lins, 2001; Mitton, 2002).
A review of prior studies suggests that 
most studies on ESOS post performance in 
developed markets have short-term positive 
accounting and financial outcomes.  Some 
studies report no association while most 
of the earlier studies document significant 
positive association between ESOS adoption 
and improved performance (Lewellen & 
Huntsman, 1970); Coughlan & Schmidt, 
1985; Murphy, 1985).  Recent literature 
[such as Core and Guay (2001), Core and 
Larcker (2002), Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999), Ittner et al. (2003)] however, 
report mixed results that fuel the current 
debate further. 
The above discussion thus far has questioned 
whether ESOS or ESOP is effective as a 
mechanism to mitigate agency problems or 
it is just another tool of wealth expropriation. 
The answer to this question is crucial as 
the implications or consequences of these 
findings are far-reaching.  ESOS or ESOP is 
considered effective if it meets the intended 
objectives which include changes in size, 
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income above its target level.  This includes 
improvement in the firms’ performance after 
ESOS adoption.  Conversely, ESOS is only 
a tool of wealth expropriation if the usual 
determinants of ESOS adoption are not met 
and the post-adoption performance has not 
improved.  
Methodology
Data and Sample Selection
This study covers an observation period 
from 1st January 1989 to 31st December 
2004. It is believed that 16-year period 
would encompass various Malaysian 
economic and financial market scenarios 
of stable (1989–1992), boom (1993–1996), 
decline (1997–1998), recovery (1999–2001) 
and stable (2002–2004) periods. Moreover, 
this study limits its observation to events no 
earlier than 1989 due to the unavailability 
of data. Furthermore, this study also limits 
its observation window events in ESOS 
post performance to no later than 31st 
December 2004 due to the limitations of 
post- performance analysis.  This study 
requires that each firm has at least three 
Table 1
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(3) years post-adoption performance data 
to ascertain the impact of ESOS adoption. 
For simplicity, the study uses ESOS or 
ESOP interchangeably.  Table 1 displays the 
number of firms issuing ESOS for the first 
time throughout the study period.
This study includes all listed firms in the 
Malaysian Bourse regardless of its trading 
board. However, for financial and insurance 
companies, and companies trading in 
other than Malaysian Ringgit domicile 
are excluded from the initial sample due 
to different regulatory environments and 
difficulties in assessing the exchange rate. 
Initially 277 firms that had adopted the 
executive’s share option were identified 
during the study period. However, this 
figure was reduced to 214 as 62 firms 
were excluded due to delisting, mergers 
and acquisitions, regulatory and currencies 
differences, unavailability of data, and no 
suitable matched firms.
In order to see the impact of ESOS adoption 
on firms’ performance, we used the match 
pair methodology similar to the one used by 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998).  To avoid size 
and industry bias, the non-adopting firms are 
to be at least 75 per cent of the asset-scale 
and within the same industrial sector.  Table 




Number  of firms
First time ESOS adopters from 1st Jan 1989 – 31st Dec 2004 277
Less:
Financial and insurance firms 8
Delisting 2
Foreign domicile 1
Untraceable and unavailability of data 28
Matched firms unavailable 24
Total number of ESOS adopter in the sample 214
Total number of ESOS non-adopter in the sample 214
Total number of samples 428
Source of Data
All financial information in this study 
is based on the Malaysian Bourse (MB) 
Annual Handbook and the respective firms’ 
annual reports. As suggested by Suret, 
Morill and Morill (1997) should there be any 
discrepancies between the two data sources 
the latest data from the firms’ annual reports 
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observation and ui are independent and 
identically distributed random variables 
with mean = 0. The observed variable, y, is 
related to yi* through the relation:
y = 1  if yi* > 0 and
y = 0  otherwise.
If u is to have a logistic distribution, then 
a logit model is produced. The likelihood 
function for the logit model is given by:
where F(.) is the distribution  of u.  For the 
logit model, F(–b Xi) is simplified:
Hence F has a close form expression as it 
does not involve integrals explicitly. The 
model can also be written as:
      
 
where Z is the linear combination of b, 
which is the coefficient estimated from 
the data, and X, which is the independent 
variable,
      
The use of this model is an adaptation of a 
similar model used by Ding and Sun (2001) 
that simplifies Matsunaga’s (1995) model. 
The model is as follows:
Original model,
Since a match pair is used, where size is 
controlled, this study proposes,
           
 
Initially, ESOS adopted firms were detected 
using the MB-owned monthly publication 
‘Investor Digest’. Nonetheless, further 
detection was made using the MB web 
information under ‘Change in Shareholdings’, 
and ‘Circular to Shareholders’ of respective 
firms. This action was necessary due to 
changes in the publication content, which 
eliminate ‘Company’s announcements’ on 
ESOS adoption post-1999 period.
Determinants of ESOS Adoption
This study employs the uses the logit 
regression model to test the hypotheses built. 
The logit analysis is used when the linear 
probability model is unable or not suitable 
to describe the pattern of the data. The linear 
probability can be written as;
where Xi is the vector of explanatory variables, b is the vector of unknown 
parameters and ui  is the random error. The 
conditional expectation E(yi  Xi) is equal to 
b Xi. It can be interpreted as the probabilities 
that the event will occur given X conditions. 
The difference between the linear probability 
model and the logit model is that in the logit 
model b Xi is not E(yi  Xi) but it is E(yi*  Xi) 
where yi* is the unobserved variable. The 
logit model usually solves this by using the 
maximum like lihood method. Moreover, 
the logit model does not assume multivariate 
normality or equality in variance covariance 
matrices as in discriminant analysis. 
Therefore, it is expect that the model should 
perform better than the discriminant analysis. 
In the logit model, it is assumed that there is 
an underlying response variable yi* defined 
by the regression relationship,
where b is a vector of unknown parameters, 
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where dependent variable V
it
 is = 1 for 
adopting firms and = 0 for non-adopting 
firms, which is a categorical data, thus, the 
use of logistic regression is deemed suitable. 
Logistic regressions are used to differentiate 
characteristics between those of adopting 
and non- adopting firms. Furthermore, the 
logistic approach (model) does not assume 
multivariate normality or equality in variance 
matrices as in discriminant analysis.  
Although the present methodology leaves 
size out of the model, change in TA (Total 
Assets) is still included to capture changes 
in a firm’s size that may trigger adoption of 
ESOS.  Similarly, change in the Debt Equity 
ratio is introduced for the same reason. 
It is believed that changes in financial 
performance rather than current performance 
would provide better understanding of 
the‘push’ factor in adopting the scheme.
 
While Ding & Sun (2001) uses MBR 
(market-to-book ratio) as proxy of growth, 
this study makes use of the approximate 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for growth. Tobin’s Q is 
defined as the market value of assets divided 
by the book value of the assets (BVA). 
Market value of the asset is measured as the 
sum of market value of the equity (MVE) 
measured at the fiscal year-end plus the book 
value of liabilities (BVL).
Furthermore, income over target (IOT) 
measures the extent of the firms’ income that 
is higher than its target level:
IOT = (Income – Target);     
if Income > Target, otherwise, INC = 0
Income is the net income of the firm for 
the year and Target is set based on the 
previous year’s income. The logic behind 
!Z#
#
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this definition of Target is to benchmark 
the income against some adaptive 
expectation that is not below the previous 
year’s income with allowance for growth 








if Incomet-1 > Incomet-3, Target=Incomet-1 
The family-owned firms (DumF) variable 
is added into the model to provide a better 
picture of the Malaysian corporate scenario. 
Although this variable is rarely seen in 
developed market-based models, Claessens 
et al. (2002) and Khatri et al. (1999) have 
purported that family influence is evident 
in the Malaysian corporate culture. In this 
study, a firm is considered as a family-owned 
firm if a family’s shareholding (directly or 
indirectly owned, or combined) is more than 
50 per cent with at least two (2) persons from 
the same family (immediate or intermediate) 
sitting in the firm’s board of directors.
Each of the ownership variables (managerial, 
individual, institutional, and government 
ownership) is denoted using cumulative 
percentages. Institutional ownership refers 
to the share owned by other firms including 
banks, insurance, and trust fund companies. 
Moreover, government-linked companies 
(GLCs) are differentiated from other 
institutional blockholders due to investment 
preferences. In this study, bo is a constant; b1 
to b
10
 are the coefficients corresponding to the 
independent variables; and e is a Gaussian 
residual term.
ESOS Adoption and Firms Post Performance
If the idea of ESOS adoption is converging 
the interest of the managers and the 
shareholders, the firms’ performance after 
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facilitate the comparison, firms’ performance 
is not just compared against itself but also 
against a match-pair firm which  resembles 
the adopting firm in terms of size and 
industry as explained earlier.  
Several financial ratios are analysed to 
measure the various aspects of performance. 
The indicators (ratio) selected for this 
purpose include: operating income to sales 
[operating-profit margins (OPM)]; net 
income to sales [net-profit margin (NPM)]; 
net income to total asset [return on assets 
(ROA)]; net income to total equity [return on 
equity (ROE)]; Tobin’s Q; and debt to asset 
ratio (D/A). These variables are similarly 
used by other ESOS-based studies by Jain & 
Kini (1994), Pugh, Oswald & Jahera (2000) 
and Yeo, Chen, Ho & Lee (1999). While the 
first four ratios are focused on profitability 
and operating performances, D/A is a proxy 
for leverage, and Tobin’s Q is for growth. 
As for the years (unless noted, all years are 
fiscal years) following and including the 
ESOS adoption, each ratio is compared to 
its corresponding value at the end of the 
year before the ESOS adoption (referred 
to as the base year). The base year is noted 
as year –1, the year of ESOS adoption is 
year 0, and so on and so forth. Therefore, 
an (-1,0) event window presents the change 
in the financial ratio from the end of year 
–1 to the end of year 0; thus, the change in 
the ratio is concurrent with ESOS adoption. 
Changes are tested for up to three years after 
the adoption as a longer event window will 
produce fewer observations. 
Change is calculated as ,         
                                
where PT refers to the relevant ratios 
for the ESOS firm and PC refers to the 
corresponding ratio for tindustry control. If 
ESOS had no effect, then one would expect 
the change in the ESOS firm ratio to be no 
different, on the average, from the change in 
the overall industry. 
The growth in these measures is able to 
provide some explanations for the change in 
the performance experienced by the ESOS 
adopted firms during the first few years 
after the adoption of the scheme. Tests are 
based on two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
test, a non-parametric alternative to paired-
samples t test. This test, as well as other 
standard parametric tests, assumes that the 
observations are independent. Moreover, 
Yeo et al. (1999) pointed out that Barber & 
Lyon (1996) have shown that this method 
performs better than the t-test in detecting 
abnormal performance.
Findings and Discussion
Determinants of ESOS Adoption
We first report the size of the two groups 
(adopting and non-adopting firms) to ensure 
that they are more or less homogeneous 
within the acceptable range.  Panel A of 
Table 3 shows that the firms’ size between 
the two groups are almost similar.
To casually see the differences of the two 
groups based on other independent variables, 
the same test (matched pair t-test) was re-
run.  Results, as displayed in Panel B of 
Table 3, indicate that the two groups differ 
particularly in terms of changes in firm 
size and level of managerial shareholdings. 
Under both variables, the adopters have a 
higher mean than the non-adopting firms. 
At the surface (first level of analysis), the 
results do indicate as though ESOS has 
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We ran logistic regressions on equation 8 and 
the result is as displayed in Table 4. Recall 
that one of the main objectives of this paper 
is to find evidence to see if ESOS is used for 
efficiency reasons and thus help mitigate the 
agency problems.  ESOS adoption is to act 
as a catalyst to firms’ improved performance 
in terms of changes in size, changes in 
leverage, higher growth and to strive for 
income above their target level.  
Results in Table 4 yield interesting stories 
when three variables are found to be 
significant in explaining the decision to 
issue ESOS when size is kept the same. 
Changes in total asset (Chg_TA_1_0), 
income over target (IOT), and family- 






























19% of the decision to issue ESOS.  This 
model is significant with at least 99% 
confidence level and has a pseudo R2 of 
0.19. Although the explanatory power is 
not huge, it does indicate that the model is 
able to explain 19% of the ESOS-adoption 
decision.   Moreover, it is not the focus of this 
study to predict which factors are important 
in ESOS adoption but rather to see if the 
reasons behind the adoption do follow what 
the theory suggests. 
Firm’s size growth appears to be an important 
‘push’ factor to adopt ESOS.  This variable is 
adopted from Parthasarathy et al. (2006) with 
the intention to capture not only firm’s size 
(this has been controlled in this study) but 
also to incorporate transformation in firm’s 
Table 3








Firm Size (lg TA) 12.43 12.44 -.57 .57
Panel B 
Change in Total Asset  -1,0 
(Chg TA 1/0)
.18 .09 3.48 .00
Change in Debt Equity Ratio -1,0  
(Chg DE 1/ 0)
.00 -.05 .80 .42
Growth Proxy (Tobins Q) 1.03 1.03 .65 .52
Managerial Shareholdings (MSH) .15 .12 2.14 .03
Individual Shareholdings (IDVSH) .18 .20 -1.15 .25
Institutional Shareholdings (INSSH) .53 .55 -.68 .50
Government-linked Companies 
Shareholdings (GLCSH)
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asset size. Descriptive statistics in Table 
3 confirm that ESOS-adopting firms have 
almost double the growth rate compared to 
that of the non-adopters. This rapid growth 
if left unchecked could pose a threat for a 
possible moral hazard problem as claimed 
by Choe (1999), who suggests that agents 
forsake the firms’ best interest for their own 
due to the abundance of assets. Therefore, 
one way of interpreting the results would be 
that the shareholders are taking proactive 
measures (by adopting ESOS) to ensure the 
executives’ (agents) future actions are for 
the firms’ best interest.  
However, the above finding could also be 
interpreted differently as there is a possibility 
of managing the accounting figures to justify 
the decision to issue or adopt ESOS.  The 
sudden growth of firm-size over a short 
period (between a year after adoption and 
the adoption year) does raise concern if 
such numbers are orchestrated given a 
long process of ESOS adoption. There are 
at least four (4) phases of ESOS adoption 
including: (a) initiating idea (first intention 
to introduce ESOS), (b) the planning phase, 
(c) endorsement by shareholders usually in 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM), and (d) 
approval from the Securities Commission. 
Each phase would roughly take about a year. 
Combining all the phases, the whole process 
of ESOS adoption could take between 3 
to 4 years from the inception of the idea 
to the adoption of ESOS. Given the time 
spent, the growth of firm-size could have 
been ‘planned’ so that it shows to justify the 
decision to adopt ESOS. 
Table 4
Determinants of ESOS Adoption
Variables Predicted Sign Beta Coefficient Std.Error Sig.
Chg_TA_1__0 + 2.51 0.62 0.00
Chg_DE1__0 ± -0.17 0.22 0.45
Tobins_Q + 7.21 5.37 0.18
MSH - -0.53 2.01 0.79
IDVSH - -2.36 1.98 0.23
INSSH - -1.31 1.88 0.49
GLCSH + -0.31 1.96 0.87
IOT + -0.65 0.25 0.01
DumF + 1.31 0.26 0.00
Constant -6.94 5.84 0.24
Model
-2 Log likelihood 396.52
Sig. .00
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Recall that the objective of adopting ESOS is 
to act as a ‘push factor’ for firms below their 
target incomes to meet the specified level 
of income (Ding & Sun, 2001). However, 
the result of this study suggests otherwise. 
Firms which are already achieving their 
target incomes are the ones eager to adopt 
ESOS.  Implicitly, the finding suggests that 
ESOS is not being issued to ‘push’ managers 
to work harder i.e. to increase profitability. 
The lower the extent of income compared 
to that of the target (last year is income or 
the average of the last three years’ income) 
the more is the likelihood of adopting ESOS. 
This evidence shows that ESOS is not being 
used to mitigate agency problems. 
Another potential explanation is that 
managers are taking advantage of the lower 
share price as a result of having lower income 
to exercise their rights to buy the firm’s 
share at discounted prices.  Since managers 
have more information about the future 
well-being of the firm than the shareholders, 
they would be able to cash in their ESOS 
when good news is released in future.  The 
setting is convenient for the managers if 
the shareholders buy the idea that ESOS 
is being issued to align the interest of the 
managers and the shareholders (or between 
the majority and the minority shareholders) 
but in reality is it just another means of 
siphoning wealth from the firm.
The practice of issuing ESOS is more 
prevalent among the family-owned firms 
than any other types of firms.  Indirectly this 
evidence supports the contention made by 
Claessens et al. (2002), Khatri et al. (2002) 
and Lim (1981) that the presence of family-
owned firms could pose interference or 
bring about conflict of interests in the firms’ 
management.  This is made possible as owners 
of family-owned firms would normally sit or 
have their proxies in the board of directors 
and make decisions that would ultimately 
benefit them.  ESOS adoption is one of the 
many instances of where such conflict of 
interests could happen.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggest a that ESOS is typically awarded to 
executives who are related (or with extended 
family ties) to the firm’s controlling or 
dominating shareholders to preserve/gain 
wealth within/for the family.  
ESOS Adoption and Firms Post Performance
Post performance of ESOS adopting firms 
should improve if ESOS has been effective 
in aligning the interest of the managers and 
the shareholders (or between the majority 
and the minority shareholders). Each 
adopting firm’s performance is compared 
against its equivalent performance in the 
base year (one year before the adoption). Of 
the six measures that are chosen to measure 
various aspects of performance only return 
on assets (ROA) is found to be significant. 
However, the result is opposite to what is 
expected.  Instead of improving in terms of 
return on assets over the three years after the 
adoption, the adopting firms’ performances 
are deteriorating as evidenced by the negative 
values in Table 5.  
The rest of the performance measures do 
not indicate any improvement over the 
three post-adoption years.  It is premature to 
conclude at this stage that ESOS adoption 
does not result in better performance as 
the firms’ performance is subject to macro-
economic conditions as well as industry-
specific environment.  To eliminate these 
biases, the adopting firms’ performance is 
also compared against their matched-pair 
firms’ performance within the same industry 
with an equivalent size.  Findings of the 
comparative performance between the two 
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Apart from net profit margin (NPM) and 
returns on equity (ROE), other performance 
measures such as operational profitability 
(operating profit margins), assets 
management efficiency (return on assets), 
growth performance (Tobin’s Q) and firm-
risk (debt over assets) do not show any 
signs of being statistically different from 
the overall industry performances (matched-
pair firms).  Even though NPM and ROE 
of adopting and non-adopting firms are 
significantly different, the values are still 
negative implying that the adopting firms’ 
performance has not improved since the 
base year but fares better than the non-
adopting firms.  
Given the findings, there is no conclusive 
evidence of ESOS being an effective tool to 
mitigate agency problems and bring together 
the interest of the managers (majority 
shareholders) and that of the shareholders 
(minority shareholders).  Although there is 
slight evidence of adopting firms faring better 
than their industry-sized matched-pairs, the 
measures are more focused on profitability 
than efficiency.  The findings are similar to 
those reported by Yeo et al. (1999).  
Table 5














Operating Profits Margin (OPM), Median year -1 = 0.10
Median Change Firms -0.06 -0.09 -0.17 -0.25
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.80 0.08 0.81 0.07
Net Profits Margin (NPM), Median year -1 = 0.06
Median Change Firms -0.07 -0.14 -0.23 -0.11
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.31 0.61 0.64 0.56
Returns on Asset (ROA), Median year -1 = 0.65
Median Change Firms -0.05 -0.12 -0.15 -0.25
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Returns on Equity (ROE), Median year -1 = 0.08
Median Change Firms -0.09 0.01 -0.37 -0.34
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.02
Tobins Q, Median year -1 = 1.19
Median Change Firms 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.06
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.96 0.63 0.96 0.99
Debt / Asset (D/A), Median year -1 = 0.35
Median Change Firms 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01
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Table 6














Operating Profits Mgn. (OPM), 
                                  Firm Median year -1 = 0.10 
                                  Industry Adjusted Median year -1 = 0.16
Median Firms Change -0.05 -0.09 -0.16 -0.25
Median Industry Adjusted Change -0.05 -0.23 -0.22 -0.38
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.28 0.32 0.43 0.26
Net Profits Margin (NPM), 
                                    Firm Median year -1 = 0.06
                                    Industry Adjusted Median year -1 = 0.11
Median Firms Change -0.07 -0.14 -0.22 -0.10
Median Industry Adjusted Change -0.05 -0.30 -0.44 -0.60
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.34 0.04 0.01 0.00
Returns on Asset (ROA),  
                                   Firm Median year -1 = 0.65
                                   Industry Adjusted Median year -1 = 0.73
Median Firms Change -0.04 -0.12 -0.15 -0.24
Median Industry Adjusted Change -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.95 0.86 0.37 0.66
Returns on Equity (ROE), 
                                    Firm Median year -1 = 0.08
                                    Industry Adjusted Median year -1 = 0.06
Median Firms Change -0.09 0.00 -0.37 -0.34
Median Industry Adjusted Change -0.10 -0.27 -0.30 -0.58
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.57 0.04 0.64 0.00
Tobins Q,                  Firm Median year -1 = 1.19
                                   Industry Adjusted Median year -1 = 1.30  
Median Firms Change 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.06
Median Industry Adjusted Change 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.37 0.51 0.29 0.29
Debt / Asset (D/A), 
                                 Firm Median year -1 = 0.35
                                 Industry Adjusted Median year -1 = 0.42
Median Firms Change -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Median Industry Adjusted Change 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.00
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Conclusion
The theory of the firm and the agency theory 
postulate that managers acting as agents 
for the owners may pursue strategies that 
maximize their own utilities rather than 
that of the owners.  By making managers 
become part of the owners, the interest of 
the managers can be aligned with those 
of the shareholders.  Theoretically, ESOS 
adoption could help mitigate agency 
problems especially in the setting where the 
ownership of the firm is dispersed (Type I 
problem).  Since there are no dominant 
shareholders, managers who are also owners 
of the firm would work harder and would 
bear part of the consequences of their own 
decisions.  Previous studies have found 
significant relationship between executive 
compensations and firm’s performance 
although the more recent literature cast some 
doubts over the effectiveness of equity-
based compensation in mitigating agency 
problems.
The major assumption in these studies is that 
the agency problem is between the managers 
and the dispersed shareholders (Type 1 agency 
problem).  The same set of assumptions 
cannot be extended to developing countries 
or emerging markets where an insider-system 
of corporate governance with high level of 
ownership concentration, cross-holdings 
and significant participation of owners 
in management are apparent (Claessens, 
Djankov & Lang, 2000; Lemmons & Lins, 
2001; Mitton, 2002).  Since managers are 
part of the controlling shareholders, the 
agency problems as reported in under-
developed countries do not exist in the same 
manner.  Instead, the divergence of interests 
exists between the majority and the minority 
shareholders (Type II agency problem). 
Rewarding managers who are already 
controlling owners through ESOS may not 
help solve the agency problems but instead 
could be viewed as a tool to expropriate 
wealth from the firm.
Findings from this study suggest that the usual 
determinants for adopting ESOS as reasoned 
in the Western literature do not seem to hold 
in a developing- country setting.  ESOS is 
not being adopted to ‘push’ managers to 
work harder (i.e. increase profitability) as the 
relationship between the extent of income 
compared to the target and likelihood of 
ESOS adoption is negative.  The practice 
of ESOS adoption is also prevalent among 
family-owned firms than any other types 
of firms.  Whilst the significance of firm-
size growth may give the impression that 
shareholders are taking proactive measures 
to align the managers’ and the shareholders’ 
interests, the sudden jump in firm-size 
growth over a short period (between a year 
after adoption and the adoption year) does 
raise concern if such numbers are ‘massaged’ 
given the long process of ESOS adoption. 
The growth of firm-size could have been 
‘planned’ so that its increase can be used to 
justify the decision to adopt ESOS. 
The effectiveness of ESOS in aligning 
the interest of the managers/controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders 
can be gauged by the extent of improvement 
in the performance experienced after the 
ESOS adoption. Results from internal 
performance do not reveal any increase in 
performance upon the adoption of ESOS. 
Similarly, performance against industry and 
size-matched pair do not show significant 
differences between the two groups except 
for slightly better performance though still 
not as good as the performance before ESOS 
adoption.  
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